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COMMENT
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-PREMISES LIABILITY:
The Foreseeable Emergence of the Community Standard
Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich,
175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971).
INTRODUCTION
A defendant's liability for the tort of negligence is deter-
mined, in part, by the nature of the duty he owes the plain-
tiff-generally, a duty not to expose the plaintiff to an unreasona-
ble risk of harm.' Since duty depends on the relationship between
the plaintiff and the defendant,' and since this relationship often
defies precise legal characterization, defining the level or quality
of duty is usually a difficult task. At early common law, special
rules were developed to define duties in terms of frequently occur-
ring relationships. These rules were actually a judicial "codifica-
tion" of the level of duty to be imposed upon a defendant who
stands in a particular relationship to the plaintiff.
One of those special relationships was that between a
defendant-landowner or -occupier3 and a plaintiff who entered
upon the defendant's land. The rules fashioned at common law
to define the duty created by such a relationship depended solely
upon the ancient classification of the plaintiff as a trespasser,
licensee, or invitee.'
These categories and their attendant duties were far from all
encompassing, and almost from the beginning difficulties arose in
their application. In some factual situations the plaintiff did not
fit comfortably into any of the classifications.5 In other situations,
the defendant escaped liability because of the plaintiffs classifi-
cation, even though the defendant's conduct was patently unrea-
'See Winfield, Duty in Tortious Negligence, 34 COLUM. L. REv. 41 (1934).
'See LeLievre v. Gould, 1 Q.B. 491, 497 (1893).
'The orthodox view treats all those in possession of land in the same manner as the
landowner when determining the duty owed to an entrant upon the land. See W. PROSSER,
THE LAW OF TORTS 395-96 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
'PROSSER 357.
'See Wolfson v. Chelist, 284 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. 1955), for a discussion of the controversy
surrounding the proper classification of social guests. See PROSSER at 395-96 for a thorough
discussion of the difficulty of categorizing an entrant who is a public servant performing
a function within the scope of his official duties.
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sonable or irresponsible." Beyond the difficulties inherent in
applying the categories, the judicial methodology of their applica-
tion was necessarily mechanical: first, the class of the entrant was
determined; then, the duty owed by the landowner followed from
that determination without regard to the reasonableness of the
landowner's behavior. This mechanical and often rigid approach
stands in contrast to the more articulated and flexible methods
of modern jurisprudence.7 Under the mechanical approach,
courts often arrived at results fraught with conflict and harsh-
ness. This generated years of debate over the proper application
of the common law classifications in determining the duty of
defendant-landowners."
With this backdrop of controversy, Colorado, in the 1971
decision of Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich," joined a small but
growing number of states"' in abrogating the common law classifi-
cations as conclusive determinants of the level of duty owed by a
landowner to persons coming upon his land. Instead, the court
applied a standard of duty no different from that imposed upon
any other defendent: the landowner must conduct himself as a
reasonable man under the circumstances. The category of the
entrant is to be considered, but is not to ultimately control the
liability of the land occupier."
The purpose of this comment is to analyze the significance
of this change in the law of Colorado, highlighting both proce-
dural and substantive effects of the Mile High decision and ex-
ploring its impact upon the theoretical foundations of negligence
'Blyth v. Topham, 79 Eng. Rep. 139 (C.P. 1607). See also Susquehanna Power Co. v.
Jeffress, 159 Md. 465, 150 A. 788 (1930) (harm caused by an unguarded, dangerous electric
wire).
7See, e.g., C. MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS 249-52 (1953).
'For some of the more frequent criticisms, see Green, Landowner v. Intruder: Intruder
v. Landowner. Basis of Responsibility in Tort. 21 MICH. L. REV. 495 (1923); Hughes, Duties
to Trespassers: A Comparative Survey and Revaluation. 68 YALE L.J. 633 (1959): Marsh.
The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers, 69 L.Q. REV.
182 (1953); Comment, The Outmoded Distinction Between Licensees and Invitees, 22 Mo.
L. REV. 186 (1957).
1175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971).
"'See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108. 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). See
also Pickard v. City & County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969); Louisville
Trust Co. v. Nutting, 437 S.W.2d 484 (Ky. 1968) (classifications of entrants are no longer
controlling in application of "attractive nuisance" doctrine); Taylor v. New Jersey High-
way Authority, 22 N.J. 454, 126 A.2d 313 (1956) (although the common law rule appears
to have been reinstated in New Jersey by Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co., 30 N.J. 303, 153
A.2d 1 (1959)).
'175 Colo. at 548, 489 P.2d at 314.
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law. We begin by examining the historical development of the
common law scheme of entrant classification.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND MODIFICATION OF THE COMMON
LAW CLASSIFICATIONS
Under the common law, the landowner's duty to those enter-
ing upon his land was strictly defined according to the classifica-
tion of the entrant as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee. '2 The Colo-
rado decision in Gotch v. K. & B. Packing & Provision Co.' 3
exemplifies this traditional status approach. Here the trial court
granted the defendant's motion for a nonsuit on grounds of the
plaintiff's status. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the trial
court, reasoning that the plaintiff was a mere licensee and as such
he was required to take the defendant's premises as he found
them. Had the plaintiff possessed the status of an invitee, how-
ever, the defendant's duty would have included the maintenance
of the premises in a reasonably safe condition, and, arguably,
recovery would have followed.
It is generally conceded that the common law formulation is
rooted in the characteristics of feudal society. The medieval land-
owner occupied a privileged position in society and as a result
possessed a nearly absolute right to maintain and use this prop-
erty in whatever manner and for whatever purpose he wished.' 4
Although numerous qualifications and exceptions to absolute
property rights appeared in early common law,'" these did not
include the duty to maintain and use land so that others were not
harmed. Duty, as such a qualification, did not emerge until the
law of negligence developed several centuries after feudal notions
of property rights had become cemented in English jurispru-
dence.'" As a result, the classifications of entrants upon land were
12For early cases, see Southcote v. Stanley, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195 (Ex. 1856); Chapman
v. Rothwell, 120 Eng. Rep. 471 (Q.B. 1858): Hounsell v. Smyth, 141 Eng. Rep. 1003 (C.P.
1860). See also the following three American cases which adopted the distinctions: Sweeny
v. Old Colony & N.R.R., 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 368, 87 Am. Dec. 644 (1865); Beck v. Carter,
68 N.Y. 283. 23 Am. R. 175 (1877); Gillis v. Pennsylvania R.R., 59 Pa. 129, 98 Am. Dec.
:317 (1868).
'"93 Colo. 276, 25 P.2d 719 (1933).
"Marsh, supra note 8, at 184.
'The basic land rights grew from a system of feudal tenure. Attendant to the rights
of a landowner were the many incidents of tenure such as homage, primer seisin, and
others which restricted the rights of the land possessor. See C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION
TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1962).
"rhe concept of duty was first defined in terms of foreseeability in Heaven v. Pender,
11 Q.B.D. 503. 509 (1883).
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developed independently of the law of negligence and were later
borrowed from other doctrinal areas of the law for application in
negligence cases. 7
A. The Evolution of the Three Classifications
1. Trespasser
The category of trespasser grew largely from the law of nui-
sance. Acts by a landowner, such as felling a tree onto an adjacent
highway, gave rise to an action in nuisance against the landowner
for damage suffered by a traveler." The law gradually expanded
to protect one who strayed onto land adjacent to a highway,
where his presence was considered incidental to the use of the
highway. If, however, his entry was something other than inciden-
tal, the law afforded him no protection. This resulted in two
classes of entrants: those who possessed a right of presence inci-
dent to the use of the public way; and those who entered the
landowner's premises in violation of his property rights. The lat-
ter were deemed trespassers. 9 Thus, a trespasser was one who
entered the land without legal right; that is, the landowner had
neither actually nor constructively consented to the entrance, and
the trespasser possessed no other legal privilege.20
2. Licensee
It has been suggested that the category of licensee grew from
an analogy to the law of bailments."' The bailor's duty to the
bailee, with regard to the condition of the chattel, varied accord-
ing to whether the bailment was gratuitous or for hire. If the
bailment was gratuitous, the bailor's duty was only to warn of
known defects which were concealed from the bailee.2 The rela-
tionship between landowner and licensee is analagous to that
between a bailor and gratuitous bailee. The licensee, then, is one
who possesses only the tolerance or bare consent of the land-
owner. The relationship is a gratuitous one, with the landowner
gaining no economic or other benefit from the licensee's
presence .23
"James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Trespassers, 63 YALE
L.J. 144, 145 (1953); Marsh, supra note 8, at 186.
'"Marsh, supra note 8, at 186-90.
"Id. at 187.
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 329 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
"Marsh, supra note 8, at 193-94.
"18 C.J.S. Bailments § 25 (1962).




The invitee class developed primarily under the influence of
the law of contracts." Whereas the licensee appeared in the com-
mon law as a gratuitous bailee, the invitee assumed many of the
legal traits of a contractual bailee or bailee-for-hire. The bailor
owed his bailee-for-hire the duty to inspect, correct, and/or warn
of defects in the bailed chattel.15 This relationship parallels that
between the landowner and his invitee. Invitee status existed
where the presence of the entrant provided some economic benefit
to the landowner.2" In short, the landowner exchanged the benefit
or prospective benefit that he gained from the invitee's presence
for an obligation to protect the invitee while on the premises. This
is analogous to the role of consideration in the bailment-for-hire.
It is clear then that the various categories of entrant arose in
the law of nuisance, bailment, and contract. When negligence
emerged as a tort in its own right, it borrowed these classifications
and assigned them new and often distorted meanings to meet the
needs of the general law of negligence.
B. The Emergence of Negligence
Before the early 19th century, the common law recognized
negligence as a type of fault, and as such it was often treated as
one element of a substantive tort." Thus negligence first ap-
peared in actions on the case, but gradually grew to its modern
status as a distinct tort in its own right. 9 The tort of negligence
requires proof of (1) a recognized legal duty owed by the defen-
dant to avoid exposing the plaintiff to a foreseeable and unreason-
able risk of harm, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) some injury to
the plaintiff recognized by law as compensable, and (4) a causal
connection between the breach of duty and the plaintiff's injury.'
As has already been observed,3 duty is dependent upon the
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant. Thus, in defin-
"ISee PROSSER 386-87; see also Marsh, supra note 8, at 190-95.
'RESTATEMENT, supra note 20.
"The characteristics of this class were established in the leading English case, Inder-
maur v. Dames, L.R. I C.P. 274, 35 L.J.C.P. 184, aff'd, L.R. 2 C.P. 311, 36 L.J.C.P. 181
(1866). See also RESTATEMENT § 332.
'
7
Marsh, supra note 8, at 191.
"For a discussion of the historical development of negligence as a tort, see Gregory,
Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REv. 359 (1951).
""PRossER 139-40.
:'Id. at 143.
:"See text accompanying note 2 supra.
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ing the landowner's duty, the law of negligence looked to the
relationship between him and the entrant upon his land. This
relationship was characterized by the entrant's classification as
a trespasser, licensee, or invitee.:2
The landowner's duty to the entrant was determined by (1)
his awareness of the presence of any member in the entrant's
class, and (2) his consent to this presence. The law imputed to
the landowner no knowledge of or consent to the trespasser's pres-
ence, and thus the landowner owed no duty to make or to keep
his premises safe for a trespasser, although he could not willfully
or wantonly injure him. 31 In part, this limited duty reflected the
fact that the trespasser was committing a tortious wrong against
the interest of the landowner by entering the premises in the first
instance."
However, under the principle of volenti non fit injuria (no
violence is done to one who consents), an entry consented to by
the landowner was not tortious: 5 Such bare consent to an en-
trance converted the legal status of the entrant from one of tres-
passer to one of licensee. Thus, the licensee presumably entered
the land with the knowledge and consent of the landowner who
tolerated-but did not affirmatively encourage-the entrance. 6
The licensee, like the trespasser, had to take the premises as he
found them, and the landowner's duty was only to avoid affirma-
tive acts which might injure the licensee. 7
Where consent was present in combination with the land-
owner's affirmative encouragement of the entrance for a specific
economic purpose, the entrant's status was that of an invitee.3 5
To the invitee, the landowner owed a higher level of duty than
was owed to a trespasser or licensee. Not only did the landowner
have to avoid willful and affirmative injury to the invitee, he also
had to inspect for hazards and, upon discovery, act to rectify
them or warn the entrant of their existence.39
:"PROSSER 357.
:9Deane v. Clayton, 7 Taunt. 489, 521 (C.P. 1817).
"Green, supra note 8, at 502.
:.LPROSSER 101.
:qd. at 376.
"The source of the licensee rule is Southcote v. Stanley, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195 (Ex.
1856).
:"PROSSER 385-91.
"Id. at 392-94. See also COLO. JURY INST. 12:9 (1969). A leading Colorado invitee
decision is Rocky Mountain Fuel Co. v. Tucker, 72 Colo. 308, 211 P. 383 (1922).
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In this manner, the classifications of trespasser, licensee, and
invitee constitute a continuum of the landowner's consent to and
knowledge of the plaintiffs presence upon the land. The trespass-
ing plaintiff stands in a relationship with the defendant void of
both consent and knowledge, the implication being that even if
the defendant had had knowledge of the plaintiffs presence he
would not have consented to it. The licensee relationship with the
defendant includes only that consent and knowledge which might
be inferred from the landowner's toleration of the plaintiffs pres-
ence. The invitee's relationship with the defendant-landowner,
on the other hand, is one of both consent and knowledge inferred
from the affirmative encouragement of the plaintiffs presence by
the defendant-landowner.
The classes of entrants, when applied to the wide range of
circumstances surrounding the landowner-entrant relationship,
proved to be ill equipped for their new role in the law of negli-
gence.", The devotion to history and historical antecedents in the
laws of nuisance, bailment, and contract retained considerable
importance to the relationships of the landowner with the various
classes of entrants upon his land. In these areas of the law, the
classification scheme was narrowly applied to the relationships of
landowners and entrants." However, in their application to negli-
gence cases the discrete, nearly rigid classes of plaintiffs could not
accommodate the broad scope of relationships in which negligent
injury occurred. In short, courts were forced to determine the
defendant's duty by pigeonholing the plaintiff into one of the
categories fashioned from the narrow applications of the law of
nuisance, bailment, or contract. Until recently, this mechanical
jurisprudence has persisted in the common law, and courts,
rather than abandoning it, have fashioned numerous modifica-
tions of the classification scheme-modifications as mechanical
as the original doctrine.
C. The Development of Exceptions to and Modifications of the
Common Law Categories
As a result of general dissatisfaction with the rigidity of the
categories and the increasing momentum of the general law of
negligence, exceptions and refinements developed in the plaintiff
"'See C. WILLIAMS, THE REFORM OF THE LAW 77 (1951); see also Hughes, supra note 8;
Wright, The Low of Torts: 1923-47, 26 CAN. B. REV. 46, 81-89 (1948); Comment, supra
note 8.
"Marsh, supra note 8, at 199.
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classifications and their corresponding defendant duties. These
changes included the redefinition of both the membership in the
three classes and the duty owed to each class.
1. Modifications in Class Definition and Duty Owed Tres-
passers and Licensees
The earliest common law rules held that the landowner owed
no duty to avoid negligent injury to a licensee upon his property.
Courts soon carved out an exception to the no-duty rule, holding
that where a licensee was injured because of the landowner's
failure to warn of a "latent defect," liability might be imposed. 2
Latent defects were those unknown to the entrant, as distin-
guished from patent defects-those obvious to him upon a reason-
able inspection.' :' There was no duty to warn an entrant of the
obvious or patent defect, but where the condition was latent,
unknown to the entrant, and known to the landowner, a duty to
warn was imposed." This distinction between latent and patent
defects probably arose as an extension to the liability imposed on
a landowner when he acted to trap the licensee.4" Courts found
great similarity between an injury caused by a trap and that
caused by a failure to warn of a dangerous, concealed hazard
known to the landowner but not to the entrant." In both situa-
tions, courts were seemingly responding to the wanton or willful
character of the defendant's misfeasance or nonfeasance. In this
sense the expansion of duty for latent defects was not truly an
expansion at all, but rather a recognition of more diverse conduct
as willful.
This duty to warn of latent defects was extended to both
licensees and to certain types of trespassers.4 7 Thus where a tres-
passer's presence became known to the landowner the latter owed
not only a duty to refrain from affirmative conduct injurious to
the trespasser but also a duty to warn him of any "latent defects"
that might exist on the premises.5 In short, where the landowner
'The source of this exception is found in the cases of Bolch v. Smith, 158 Eng. Rep.




'Griffith, Licensors and 'Traps', 41 L.Q. REV. 255 (1925).
'Id.
17RESTATEMENT § 338.
"Davis' Adm'r v. Ohio Valley Banking & Trust Co., 127 Ky. 800, 106 S.W. 843 (1908);
Herrick v. Wixom, 121 Mich. 384, 81 N.W. 333 (1899); Omaha & Republican Valley Ry.
v. Cook. 42 Neb. 577, 60 N.W. 899 (1894).
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had actual knowledge of a trespasser's presence, and where he
failed to eject him, the law implied his toleration of the tres-
passer's presence and imposed upon the landowner the additional
duty to warn of latent defects, as though the trespasser were
actually a licensee.'
A similar extension of duty occurred where the landowner
had implied rather than actual knowledge of the trespasser's
presence. For example, if the plaintiff was a "constant trespasser
on a limited area '"," of the premises, and if the landowner had not
taken any action to stop the practice, the trespasser again as-
sumed the status of a licensee under the fiction that customary
and tolerated trespasses were known of and consented to by the
landowner."
The duty of the landowner was also expanded in cases where
the trespasser was a child. If a hazardous or defective artificial
condition existed on the land, situated in a place where children
were likely to trespass, and if the condition constituted an "at-
tractive nuisance, ' 52 the landowner was under a duty to "exercise
reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise to protect
the children."' :1 An "attractive nuisance" was defined as any arti-
ficial condition on land which presented an unreasonable risk of
harm to children-unreasonable in that the risk could not be
perceived by children due to their youth." Consequently, the
duty owed the trespassing child approached that owed an invitee.
This is not surprising since the attractive nuisance, in some sense,
lured the child onto the premises and into danger, and thus it had
an effect similar to that of "affirmative encouragement" in invi-
tee situations. ,
These modifications of duty owed licensees and the three
subclasses of the general class of trespassers are really responses
"See, e.g., St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Douthit. 208 S.W. 201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
'"See. e.g., Wise v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 355 Mo. 1168, 76 S.W.2d 118 (1934).
"'Smith v. Philadelphia & R. Ry., 274 Pa. 97, 117 A. 786 (1922); St. Louis S.W. Ry.
v. Douthit, 208 S.W. 201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919); Davis v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 58 Wis.
646, 17 N.W. 406 (1883).
"Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry., 21 Minn. 307 (1875).
"'RESTATEMENT § 339 (emphasis added).
"Meagher v. Hirt, 232 Minn. 336, 45 N.W.2d 563 (1951).
'In 1934 the first Restatement of Torts supported the special rules pertaining to
trespassing children without any fiction of attractive nuisance. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ :339 (1934). For a discussion of the competing policies embraced by the trespassing
children doctrine, see Bohlen, The Duty of a Landowner Towards Those Entering His
Premises of Their Own Right, 69 U. PA. L. REV. 142, 237, 340, 348 (1921).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
to the strain of applying discrete plaintiff categories to negligence
cases. For many entrants, the mechanical classification scheme
worked well. To illustrate, a trespasser's presence on the land was
unconsented to, unprivileged, and unknown by the landowner,
and hence the latter's duty was severely limited. But if "known
trespassers," "constant trespassers," or "trespassing children"
were negligently injured upon the land, classifying them as mere
trespassers would bar their recovery, even though the circumstan-
ces of their trespass suggested at least constructive consent to and
knowledge of their presence by the defendant.5" To avoid the
harsh consequences of the original common law scheme, courts
began to distort the clear demarcations between classes of plain-
tiffs, extending new protection to licensees and treating some
trespassers as licensees or invitees. From case to case these expan-
sions invited uneven applications and finely-drawn distinctions
between plaintiffs.57 However, as will be demonstrated shortly,58
they did foreshadow later, more candid departures from mechani-
cal jurisprudence.
2. Modifications in Class Definition and in Duty Owed In-
vitees
At common law, one who entered land under a social invita-
tion was classified as a licensee since his presence provided no
economic benefit to the landowner. 59 The courts, however, had
difficulty in squaring the minimal duty owed the "social invi-
tee""' with the affirmative nature of his invitation. This difficulty
encouraged a broadening of the definition of an invitee to include
one who was encouraged to enter by the words or conduct of the
landowner, irrespective of economic benefit." The courts implied
from the invitation of the landowner his guarantee that the prem-
ises would be reasonably safe for the guest. Thus in some jurisdic-
tions the social guest became an invitee.62
"For an analysis of these modifications in terms of the post-Mile High foreseeability
test, see section III. A. infra.
57 See authorities cited note 8 supra.
"See section II. infra.
I'Southcote v. Stanley, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195, 1197 (Ex. 1856).
"'See, e.g., Laube v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469, 78 A.2d 693 (1951).
"The economic benefit requirement actually developed later than the implied assur-
ance theory; however, the social guest in earlier cases did not receive a per se assurance
of the safety of the premises. See PROSSER 388-89.
"'The social guest was made an invitee by statute in Connecticut. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-557a (Supp. 1973). The same result was achieved by judicial decision in
Lousiana. See Alexander v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 98 So. 2d 730
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The reasoning underlying the modern social invitee rule
found further expression in the development of a "public invitee
doctrine." As the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the
term, "A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or
remain on land as a member of the public for a purpose for which
the land is held open to the public." 3
These broader definitions brought a larger number of plain-
tiffs under the umbrella of duty owed the invitee. The modifica-
tions, however, affected only the membership of the invitee class,
not the duty owed the class. The landowner was still required to
inspect his premises 4 in order either to make them safe for an
invitee or to warn him of any hazards. 5
Although such modifications of the categories permitted
more "just" results in particular cases, they failed to correct the
confusion and complexity in issues of duty. In fact, they served
to further confuse the determination of the landowner's duty by
creating additional rigid categories to be applied to the plaintiff."
In distinguishing, for example, a "known trespasser" from all
other trespassers, courts were often forced to split definitional
hairs, and still the spectre of harsh results remained. Where a
plaintiff was injured by the clearly unreasonable conduct of a
defendant, but where the plaintiff could not be rationally placed
in a favored category, his recovery was still often barred.
Dissatisfaction with the common law expansions which had
occurred on both sides of the Atlantic led England to abolish the
distinction between invitee and licensee in 1957.67 The same pres-
sures for change were then building in America."
II. THE POINT OF DEPARTURE
A. Rowland v. Christian
With the confusion and conflict created by the varied appli-
(La. App. 1957). Colorado, however, followed the majority rule, treating social guests as
mere licensees. See Kenny v. Grice, 171 Colo. 185, 188-89, 465 P.2d 401, 403 (1969).
aRESTATEMENT § 332.
"Durning v. Hyman, 286 Pa. 376, 133 A. 568 (1926); Kallum v. Wheeler, 129 Tex. 74,
101 S.W.2d 225 (1937). See also RESTATEMENT § 343.
"Johnston v. De La Guerra Properties, 28 Cal. 2d 394, 170 P.2d 5 (1946); Dean v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 300 S.W.2d 431 (Mo. 1957).
"The court in Wolfson v. Chelist, 284 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. 1955), underscores this
observation in detail.
1
7Occupiers Liability Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, at 308 (1957). The limited duty owed a
trespasser was not changed by this legislation.




cations of the common law rules, it was inevitable that some
courts would break with tradition and refuse to apply the original
classification scheme or the modifications which had been grafted
onto it. The first court to do this was the California Supreme
Court in its 1968 decision, Rowland v. Christian.9 In this case the
plaintiff, a guest in the apartment of the defendant, injured his
hand while using a faucet in the bathroom. The defendant had
notified the landlord of the defect in the faucet and had requested
its replacement 1 month prior to the accident. At trial, the defen-
dant moved for a summary judgment alleging that the plaintiff
had used the bathroom facilities on a prior occasion and that he
had been aware of the faucet's condition. Under the traditional
common law approach, the plaintiff had been a mere licensee
since his presence in the defendant's apartment had been gratui-
tous. 7' The trial court therefore granted the defense motion, rul-
ing that the plaintiff, as a licensee, had not been entitled to a
warning.
In his appeal from the summary judgment, the plaintiff al-
leged that the defendant had owed him a duty of warning because
she had been aware of his impending use of the bathroom and of
the hazard existing therein. As a licensee, the plaintiff might still
have been entitled to a warning of the defective condition if the
condition had been latent, and if he had been unaware of it.
7'
Alternatively, if the definition of invitee had been expanded, as
it had in some jurisdictions, the plaintiff might have been consid-
ered a social invitee, and thus entitled to a warning.7 1 Instead of
permitting or denying recovery by selecting an appropriate plain-
tiff classification, or by creating a new one, the court held:
The proper test ... is whether in the management of his property
[the defendant] has acted as a reasonable man in view of the proba-
bility of injury to others, and, although the plaintiffs status as a
trespasser, licensee, or invitee may in the light of the facts giving rise
to such status have some bearing on the question of liability, the
status is not determinative.
7
3
The court concluded that modern society could no longer justify
the supremacy of landowner rights over the life and limb of en-
trants. Since the common law classifications primarily served
"'69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
7"Hansen v. Richey, 237 Cal. App. 2d 475, 481, 46 Cal. Rptr. 909, 911 (1967).
7See text accompanying notes 42-46 supra.
2See text accompanying notes 59-63 supra.
7:'69 Cal. 2d at 114, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
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landed interests, the court chose to "turn the corner" away from
the classifications and to install in their place the general rules
of negligence for determining the duty of the landowner vis-A-vis
the entrant upon his land .7 This decision provided the stimulus
for other jurisdictions, including Colorado, to institute a more
modern concept of duty in cases of premises liability.
B. Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich
In 1971 the Colorado Supreme Court was faced with a situa-
tion much like that presented by Rowland. In Mile High Fence
Co. v. Radovich,75 the defendant occupied land for the purpose of
erecting a fence. At the end of a day's work, several post holes had
not been permanently filled with fence posts; however, employees
of the defendant had temporarily placed posts in all but one of
the empty holes. This open hole was located approximately 7
inches from the edge of an alley. Late that evening Radovich, a
policeman on duty, strayed from the alley and stepped into the
open hole, breaking his leg. There were no barricades, warning
lights, or other protective devices to alert the plaintiff to the
hazard. The trial court granted judgment for the plaintiff.
7
1
The defendant appealed, alleging that Radovich entered the
property as a licensee, that the hazard was apparent upon a rea-
sonable inspection, and that he was therefore owed no duty of
warning.77 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment for the
plaintiff, concluding that the entrant's status or classification as
an invitee, trespasser, or licensee was no longer controlling in
determining the landowner's duty. 71 In affirming the court of ap-
peals decision, the Colorado Supreme Court held:
IS/tatus or classification of one who is upon the property of another
is not to be determinative of the occupant's responsibility or the
degree of care which he owes to that person.
7 1
"The court cited as a further justification for its decision section 1714 of the Civil
Code:
Every one is responsible, not only for the results of his willful acts. but also
for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in
the management of his property or person . ...
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1973).
7.175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971).
'Id. at 538-39, 489 P.2d at 309.
'7d. at 539. 489 P.2d at 310. The company also argued that the trial court erred in
not finding Radovich contributorily negligent for his failure to use his flashlight.
7'1d. at 539-40, 489 P.2d at 310.
71Id. at 548. 489 P.2d at 314.
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The court gave two reasons for its decision. First, *the tradi-
tional rules bred conflict and confusion, resulting in a number of
th'e exceptions and modifications discussed earli.er. '" The differ-
ent interpretations of an individual's status in different courts in
the same jurisdiction also compounded litigation."
The second reason given by the court was that the traditional
approach usurped the jury function. The court felt that the com-
mon law rules were active in "preventing the jury from applying
changing community standards to a landowner's duties, a harsh-
ness which is inappropriate to a modern legal system.""2 The
court expressed concern that the mechanical application of the
common law classifications to determine the landowner's duty
often resolved the question of liability as a matter of law. Thus,
the rigid application of the common law classifications, instead
of permitting a flexible jury assessment, often acted to deny meri-
torious claimss :' In order to achieve more equitable results, the
court set forth the following rule:
[lit is the foreseeability of harm from the failure by the possessor
to carry on his activities with reasonable care for the safety of the
entrants which determines liability."
Thus, Colorado joined California in abrogating the common law
classifications as the sole factor in ascertaining the duty of a land
occupier to one injured upon his land.
5
"See section I.C. supra.
"The court cited Smith v. Windsor Reservoir & Canal Co. as having been before the
court on four occasions as a result of conflict and confusion in determining the class to
which an entrant belonged. These four cases, all of the same name, are found at 78 Colo.
169, 240 P. 332 (1925); 82 Colo. 497, 261 P. 872 (1927); 88 Colo. 422, 298 P. 646 (1931); 92
Colo. 464, 21 P.2d 1116 (1933).
12175 Colo. at 542, 489 P.2d at 312.
"Id. at 543-46, 489 P.2d at 312-13. The court indicated that decisions as a matter of
law were the rule rather than the exception in Colorado citing, inter alia, Dunbar v.
Olivieri, 97 Colo. 381, 50 P.2d 64 (1935); Gotch v. K. & B. Packing & Provision Co., 93
Colo. 276, 25 P.2d 719 (1933); Catlett v. Colorado & S. Ry., 56 Colo. 463, 139 P. 14
(1914); Watson v. Manitou & P.P. Ry., 41 Colo. 138, 92 P. 17 (1907).
"175 Colo. at 547, 489 P.2d at 314 (emphasis added) (adopting the position of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts). This foreseeability and reasonableness standard in Mile
High was "codified" in the 1973 revision of the Colorado civil jury instructions. The new
instruction states that the owner or occupant of the premises must use reasonable care to
keep his premises in a reasonably safe condition, in the light of the foreseeability of injury
to others. COLO. JURY INST. 12:9 (Supp. 1973).
"A comparsion of Mile High and Rowland reveals several similarities. First, both
plaintiffs would have been licensees under the common law rules. The instrumentalities
in both cases were either unknown to the plaintiff or not obvious to him upon a reasonable
inspection. In Rowland, the defect in the faucet was not obvious to the plaintiff. In Mile
High, the indirect lighting in the alley was insufficient to illuminate the open post hole.
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III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE Rowland AND Mile High IMPACT
Thus far we have examined the rigid common law classifica-
tions as they grew from the privileged status of the landowner in
feudal society. The classification scheme attempted to divide the
duty owed by landowners to entrants into three discrete levels
according to the equally discrete classes of entrants. Since the
duty actually varied continuously across the spectrum of possible
plaintiffs and depended on other factors in addition to the en-
trant's class, the results of this scheme were uneven and often
harsh. C*ourts created a number 6f exc'eptions to the .classes and
fashioned 6ertain legal *fictions which either elevated some en-
trants to a class -owed a higher duty or raised the level of duty
owed a particular class. But far from correcting the problems,
these changes further compounded the confusion and complexity
surrounding questions of landowner duty.
The California Supreme Court in Rowland sought to rectify
these difficulties by refusing to apply the entrant's class as the
conclusive determinant of the landowner's duty and instead im-
posed a duty of reasonable care under all relevant circumstances.
This constituted an application of the general law of negligence.
Subsequently, in Mile High, Colorado joined California in abro-
gating the strict classification scheme and in adopting the general
law of negligence for questions of landowner duty.
To date, subsequent case law in both California and Colo-
rado has been inadequate for a conclusive evaluation of either
Rowland's or Mile High's impact. Nevertheless, the existing case
experience does point to certain trends and influences developing
as a result of these decisions. For example, 1 year after Rowland
was decided, the California Court of Appeals, in the case of
Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course," refused to apply the prin-
ciples of Rowland to an invitee case. The court ruled that al-
though Rowland may have changed the method of determining
the duty owed a licensee, it did not alter the duty rules of prior
invitee decisions.
7
Thus, both courts suggested that a basis for the liability of the landowner might have
existed under common law. In both cases, the court chose not to perpetuate the common
law classifications but rather to impose upon the occupier an obligation to use his property
reasonably in light of the foreseeability of harm.
"273 Cal. App. 2d 20, 77 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1969). The California Court of Appeals for
the Fifth District has also sanctioned this approach of not applying Rowland to invitees.
See Solgaard v. Guy F. Atkinson Co.. 16 Cal. App. 3d 881, 884 n.1, 94 Cal. Rptr. 471, 474
n.1 (1971).
17273 Cal. App. 2d at 23, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 918.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
Decisions like Beauchamp in both California and Colorado
serve to focus the remainder of this comment upon the theoreti-
cal, procedural, and substantive implications of abrogating the
common law classification scheme. The theoretical implications
act to establish the framework in which the new rule will be
applied and hence provide a logical starting point for analysis.
A. The Foreseeability of Relation and Risk: A Theoretical
A nalysis
In the famous decision of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad
Co.," Chief Judge Cardozo stated the essence of the general law
of negligence: "itihe risk reasonably to be perceived defines the
duty to be obeyed""' and "negligence, like risk, is . . . a term of
relations."!' ) Read together, these two statements support the ear-
lier observation' that the "risk to be reasonably foreseen" de-
pends largely upon the "relation" between plaintiff and defen-
dant. This reasoning prompted Professor Prosser to characterize,
in extremely broad terms, that relation between a plaintiff and
defendant which determines duty: a relation "of close proximity
in time, space, and direct causal sequence, between a negligent
defendant and the person he injures." 2
The common law classification scheme for determining a
landowner's duty to those entering upon his land arose outside
these principles of the general law of negligence.93 Reformulating
the classification approach in terms of these principles reveals the
root cause of the difficulty with the scheme's operation. To illus-
trate, the presence of an adult trespasser is usually "unknown"
to the landowner. This is equivalent, in most cases, to saying the
trespasser's presence is not "reasonably foreseeable" and, like




Under both the common law scheme and the general law of negli-
gence then, the trespasser is owed no duty to be protected from
risks of harm. This follows because all risks of harm to a plaintiff
"248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
"Id. at 341, 162 N.E. at 100.
"'Id. at 341, 162 N.E. at 101.
"See text accompanying note 2 supra.
1
2Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 Mint. L. REV. 1, 15 (1953).
See section I. supra.
"The court's decision in Palsgrof constituted a finding that Mrs. Palsgraf was not a
foreseeable plaintiff, and therefore no duty was owed her by the railroad. See Palsgraf v.




whose presence is unforeseeable must be outside that class of
risks that are to be "reasonably foreseen" and which "define the
duty to be obeyed." Phrased differently, the plaintiff-trespasser
and the landowner-defendant stand in a relation devoid of "close
proximity in time, space, and direct causal sequence," and no
duty in negligence terms exists.
Similarly, the common law exceptions to and modifications
of the original status approach can be described in terms of fore-
seeability. When courts created the special classes of "constant
trespasser,". "known trespasser," and "trespassing children,"
and provided greater protection to these classes, they were im-
plicitly recognizing that these plaintiffs were more foreseeable
than the typical trespasser. Likewise, courts perceived a greater
foreseeability of harm to noninvitee entrants from latent defects
than from patent ones, and hence recognized a duty to warn of
latent defects. As to social and public invitees, the courts which
recognized these statuses were responding to the absence of any
real difference in foreseeability of harm to members of the eco-
nomic, social, and public invitee classes."
The difficulty with the common law scheme should now be
clear: the presence of all entrants, even within the same class, is
not equally foreseeable, and to apply a single rigid level of duty
to any one class of plaintiffs disrupts the underlying theory of
negligence law. Although foreseeability, with few exceptions, in-
creases continuously as the plaintiff moves through the classes
(from trespasser, through licensee, and into invitee), the specific
level of duty increases in discrete steps.
B. The Post-Mile High Role of Plaintiff Status
In cases where the plaintiff would have been classified as a
trespasser or licensee under the traditional scheme, the general
law of negligence should now increase the probability of his recov-
ery. Instead of losing to a per se rule of law because he is classified
as a trespasser or licensee, the plaintiff may recover under the
tests of foreseeable risk, foreseeable plaintiff, and reasonableness
of the defendant's conduct. However, in the case of an invitee, it
"It is of note that the early common law rules gave greater protection to invitees than
to any other class of entrants. Although the differing levels of duty for trespassers and
licensees demonstrate a correspondence between "knowledge of presence" and the Mile
High foreseeabilitv approach, the old invitee rule turned on the existence of economic
benefit. Economic benefit, however, has no correspondence with the foreseeability stan-
dard, since such benefit is irrelevant to the foreseeability of the plaintiffs presence.
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is quite possible that the strict duty of inspection, repair, and/or
warning owed him under the common law scheme will not be
owed under these tests of general negligence law (or may not be
owed in every situation where the plaintiff is an invitee).
Although we know from both Rowland and Mile High that
the common law classifications retain some importance in deter-
mining the extent of landowner liability, 7 defining the role of the
classifications with any precision is a difficult task. In Mile High,
the Colorado Supreme Court commented on this role rather
cryptically:
A person's status as a trespasser, licensee or invitee may, of course,
in the light of the facts giving rise to such status, have some bearing
on the question of liability, but it is only a factor-not conclusive."
It is noteworthy that the court speaks of the plaintiff's status as
a factor in establishing liability. In contrast, the tests of foreseea-
bility and reasonableness are characterized as questions going to
the landowner's duty." This suggests that the plaintiff's status is
relevant in determining the defendant's breach of duty as defined
under the general principles of foreseeability and reasonableness.
In making reference to "facts giving rise to such status," the
Mile High court probably had in mind facts such as the plaintiff's
purpose in entering the premises, his manner of entry, and his
conduct while on the premises, as well as the defendant's consent
or lack of consent to the entry. These were the salient factual
considerations under the original common law approach used in
determining the plaintiff's status. Although these facts, like the
status which they determine, may bear on the breach of duty
question, it is also possible that such facts will serve as key factors
in other elements of liability, most notably causation. Indeed, the
conditions of entry and the details of plaintiff and defendant
conduct during the injury-producing relationship are the very
facts needed to support any finding on the causation issue.
Whatever the precise role ultimately given the plaintiff's sta-
tus, it is certain the plaintiff classes will act at least as a guide
in characterizing that critical "relationship" between the plain-
"7Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 114, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104
(1968); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 548, 489 P.2d 308, 314-15 (1971).
11175 Colo. at 548, 489 P.2d at 314-15 (emphasis added to "liability").
"Id. at 548, 489 P.2d at 314. The court here speaks of status as no longer being
determinative of the landowner's "responsibility" and the requisite "degree of care";
rather, reasonableness and foreseeability apply in this regard.
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tiff and defendant which measures the foreseeability of the plain-
tiff's presence. In a majority of cases, the risk of harm and the
foreseeability of presence will still be greater for an invitee than
for a trespasser, and hence the duty owed the former will still be
greater than that owed the latter. However, it is also clear that
circumstances other than the plaintiff's classification may signifi-
cantly influence the foreseeability of his presence or of the risk of
harm to him, and these, too, will now be considered in defining
duty. For example, on a construction site in a crowded urban area
the risk of harm and foreseeability of presence may be nearly the
same for a trespasser as for an invitee.
C. From Law to Fact
Examining the role of the plaintiff's status suggested by Mile
High leads to other interrelated changes in premises liability
cases. It seems certain that status is to have more impact as a
matter of fact or facts than as a matter of law. In Mile High itself,
the Colorado Supreme Court analyzed many facts which would
previously have gone to the legal classification of the plaintiff, but
now such facts are used to test the foreseeability of the entrant
and the risk of harm to him. The court examined such facts as
the quality of lighting and the proximity of the open hole to the
edge of the alley" ' and held that foreseeability and reasonable-
ness could be determined as matters of fact during the trial. The
court thus stressed the need for a comprehensive presentation of
facts in defining the level of duty owed the plaintiff by the prem-
ises occupier.
In a 1972 decision, Ward v. Enevold,11" the Colorado Court
of Appeals applied the Mile High ruling and accomplished a re-
sult which probably could not have been achieved under the tra-
ditional status approach. This case clearly illustrates the impor-
tance of factual analysis to the tests of foreseeability and reasona-
bleness. In Ward the plaintiff was injured when she slipped and
fell after leaving a bar and while entering the rear portion of
property owned by an adjacent bar. The injury occurred at night
and the area was poorly lit. In holding the defendant bars liable,
the court reasoned that the pedestrian was a foreseeable entrant
upon the affected properties and that the hazardous condition
which caused her injury constituted an unreasonable risk of
"'Id. at 538-39, 489 P.2d at 309.
"'u504 P.2d 1108 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
harm. Under the traditional status approach this plaintiff would
have been classified a licensee at best, and the possibility of re-
covery would have been severely limited."
2
Although cases like Ward imply an extensive foreseeability
to be imputed to many landowners, the Colorado Supreme Court
in Mile High explicitly warns against any imposition of absolute
liability upon such defendants."' : This warning was heeded by the
Colorado Court of Appeals in its 1972 decision, Kaffel v. Clover-
leaf Kennel Club. "" Here the plaintiff was a paying customer of
the defendant racetrack (and hence, an invitee). He was injured
when a beer keg fell off a vehicle and onto his foot. The keg was
under the control of a delivery man not employed by the race-
track, and the keg was being delivered to a concession stand
leased to a concessionaire by the defendant. Citing Mile High as
precedent, the court concluded that nothing in the evidence
would lead a reasonably prudent man in the defendant's position
to foresee this risk of harm, and recovery was denied. Thus, al-
though Mile High demands an extensive foreseeability analysis,
application of the test is not synonymous with plaintiff victory.
D. Jury Function: The Importance of the "Community Stan-
dard"
Since the issue of duty is no longer a matter of per se legal
classification, judges may not decide the issue purely as a matter
of law."' 5 They must permit the trier of fact to judge circumstan-
ces, reasonableness, and foreseeability, and to apply "community
standards"'" in these judgments. This change was foreshadowed
by the majority in Mile High when it observed that the abroga-
tion of the classification scheme would end the usurpation of jury
functions by judges. Under the traditional approach the plaintiff
was often deprived of a jury's "community-oriented" evaluation
of the defendant's conduct "in light of all the relevant circum-
""In relation to the bar that she had patronized, the plaintiff's status as an invitee
had terminated prior to the time of the injury. As to the second defendant bar, the plaintiff
was a trespasser.
""Specifically, the court comments that "[iln overruling Lunt and Gotch we do not
mean to imply that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover as a matter of law." 175 Colo.
at 548, 489 P.2d at 314.
1'504 P.2d 374 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972).
"''See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra.
"'"The leading case on "community standards" and their role in duty determination
is Levine v. Russell Blaine Co., 273 N.Y. 386, 7 N.E.2d 673 (1937). See also Weisbart v.
Flohr, 260 Cal. App. 2d 281, 67 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1968).
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stances," because judges would rule on duty as a matter of law." 7
Now, however, the plaintiff's status is only one of many relevant
circumstances to be considered by a jury in applying community
standards to the facts of the case.
The community standard in negligence cases defines what
risks the "reasonably prudent man""" would have reasonably
toreseen under the particular set of circumstances. This consti-
tutes the "standard of care" by which the defendant's conduct is
to be measured. In view of both the theoretical and practical
importance of' the community standard, it is fitting for the jury
to assume a larger role in questions of duty, since a jury is suppos-
edly the true representative of the community and its stan-
dards.""' Arguably, a jury in its collective wisdom is better
equipped than any single judge to represent community stan-
dards. Indeed judges applying an ancient classification scheme,
even with modern twists, are in a doubtful position to reflect the
dynamic nature of contemporary society.")
The shift of decisionmaking to the jury has not occurred as
smoothly as one might have hoped. There has been concern ex-
pressed for the potential lack of certainty created by the
Rowland-Mile High approach. Juries, for example, will vary
greatly in the quality and rationality of their deliberations. Such
systemic biases as the imposition of liability against defendants
merely because they are capable of compensating a less fortunate
plaintiff may now be permitted free rein in negligence cases."'
Justice Burke, dissenting in Rowland, expressed the fear that
"today's decision appears to open the door to potentially unlim-
ited liability .*.. ."2 These concerns prompted the California
1'Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 543, 489 P.2d 308, 312 (1971).
""PRoSSER 149-66.
""'See Comment, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 427. 430-31 (1969).
"'The shift to a larger role for juries is borne out by the case experience in both
jurisdictions. Many of the California decisions following Rowland and the Colorado deci-
sions following Mile High overturned judgments in favor of defendants because they were
based on rulings made as a matter of law. Such cases were remanded for consideration
by a jury. See Mark v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 7 Cal. 3d 170, 496 P.2d 1276, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 908 (1972); Minoletti v. Sabini, 27 Cal. App. 3d :321, 103 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1972); Hurst
v. Crowtero Boating Club, Inc., 496 P.2d 1054 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972); Hall v. Cheyenne
Mt. Museum & Zoological Soc'y. 492 P.2d 894 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972).
"'This fear was first expressed in the 19th century. See Marsh, supra note 8, at 185-
86.
o'69 Cal. 2d at 115, 443 P.2d at 569. 70 Cal. Rptr. at 105 (Burke, J., dissenting).
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Court of Appeals in Beauchamp'" to delimit the full implication
of Rowland:
IWle do not believe such established decisional principles [as
those relating to the invitee status] have been abandoned and free-
wheeling by the triers of fact substituted in their stead."'
The court cautioned that withdrawal from the status approach
would limit the power of the court to control potential jury
abuses."15 It is noteworthy, however, that these very same con-
cerns led to the original judicial "codification" of duty for "fre-
quently occurring plaintiff-defendant relationships" and ulti-
mately to the classification scheme abrogated by Rowland and
Mile High. It is of further note that Colorado courts, as exempli-
fied by the Kaffel decision,"' have shown no reluctance in apply-
ing Mile High to invitee cases.
The concern expressed by the California court in Beauchamp
about possible jury abuses has not surfaced in the post-Mile High
decisions in Colorado. Generally, the courts are demanding that
premises liability cases go to the jury. In Cline v. Brown Palace
Hotel Co.," 7 for example, the court of appeals reversed the trial
court's directed verdict for the defendant on the grounds that the
issue of negligence may be taken from the jury and decided by
the court as a matter of law only in the clearest of cases, as where
there are undisputed facts about which reasonable minds could
not differ."6
There are often other concerns attending a jury preference in
questions of landowner duty. For example, locale will influence
the attitude of jurors. In urban areas land will tend to be far less
important than people, while in rural areas the sanctity of the
landowner's interest is more likely to dominate."' A related factor
important to jury preference is the identity of the parties. In
Colorado negligence cases which have followed Mile High, a high
proportion of the defendants have been corporate entities."" If the
":1273 Cal. App. 2d 25, 77 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1969). See also text accompanying note 86
supra.
"'Id. at 24, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 918.
"'Id. at 25, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
""See text accompanying note 104 supra.
"7492 P.2d 873 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971).
"lId. at 875.
Juries are now drawn from voter registration lists instead of from property tax rolls
as a constitutional requirement to insure the cross-sectional character of juries. See Thiel
v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
'2"Ranke v. Fowler Real Estate Co., 497 P.2d 1268 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972); Hurst v.
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tendency of a jury to favor individual plaintiffs over corporate
defendants persists,'' the jury preference could have a profound
effect on the probability and amount of recovery.
All such fears of jury bias are questionable. There is little
evidence of any differences, quantitative or qualitative, between
juror and judge biases.' Moreover, even jury biases are part of
that "community standard" underlying the law of negligence.
Admittedly existing biases will exert more influence in the ab-
sence of strict guidelines for the jury in the determination of the
defendant's duty, and neither Rowland nor Mile High provide
guidance other than the generalized tests of "foreseeability" and
"reasonableness." The absence of restrictive guidelines is not sur-
prising, however, since by their very nature the tests of foreseea-
bility and reasonableness of conduct defy any a priori definition.
To do more than set forth the general principles of decisionmak-
ing would signal a return to rigid mechanical rules not unlike
those of the original status approach.
CONCLUSION
Through the Rowland and Mile High decisions, the narrow
levels of defendant duty defined by rigid and discrete plaintiff
classifications have been replaced by a continuum of duty-a
continuum far more consistent with the fundamental principles
of negligence law. Duty depends now on the reasonable foreseea-
bility of the risk of harm which proximately causes the injury
suffered by the plaintiff. The foreseeability of the plaintiff's entry
and the risk of harm to him, and not the label of the entrant, have
become the ultimate determinants of duty.
The Rowland-Mile High approach places the jury in the piv-
otal role of applying community standards to measure the fore-
seeability of risk and the reasonableness of the landowner's con-
duct. This application of community standards under the general
law of negligence is far more flexible and responsive to individual
fact settings than the mechanical common law status approach.
Admittedly abrogation of the common law scheme may necessi-
tate some loss of certainty in premises liability cases, but the
Crowtero Boating Club, Inc., 496 P.2d 1054 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972); Kopke v. AAA Ware-
house Corp., 494 P.2d 1307 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972); Hall v. Cheyenne Mt. Museum &
Zoological Soc'y, 492 P.2d 894 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972).
"'This jury bias is discussed in James, Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence
Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667 (1949).
'1See Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REv. 1055 (1964).
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gains achieved in terms of "justice" and judicial methodology
would seem to more than compensate for this loss.
Mile High thus represents a shift from the application of
fragmented rules to a unified methodology which promises more
explicit reasoning. Although rules are not inherently bad, they are
open to abuse when rigidly applied. They act to obscure the
court's underlying thought processes and thereby preclude articu-
lated opinions. In contrast, under the general law of negligence
the plaintiff receives an evaluation of all relevant circumstances
and an application of the community standard to determine the
reasonableness of the landowner's actions. This represents a
straightforward, rational judicial method-one which squares the
practice of negligence law with its theory.
Some California courts have demonstrated a reluctance to
apply the full force of Rowland. They have seemingly limited its
precedential value to cases involving licensees. In marked con-
trast, the Colorado courts have begun to build a foundation of
precedent which refines and strengthens the Mile High decision.
It is hoped that future decisions will continue this development.
Carl E. Edwards, Jr.
Richard J Jerome
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